A Fear of Falling

A Fear of Falling

Third in a series of reports on depleted uranium weapons

Dan Fahey

August 4, 1999

A Fear of Falling

August 4, 1999

A Fear of Falling...............................................................................1

U.S. Study of Gulf War Veterans: Fact and Fiction........................... 3

The Fundamental Problem With the RAND DU Report.................. 7

Some Additional Reports Not Reviewed by RAND..........................14

DU Hazard Warnings Ignored...........................................................16

British Government Issues DU Advisory............................................18

DU in the Kosovo War.....................................................................19

U.S. Army Switches to Tungsten...................................................... 21

Canada: No to DU............................................................................23

Rhymes with "Cheddar".................................................................... 24

Documents Cited in A Fear of Falling.................................................25

Web Sites Containing Depleted Uranium Information..........................26

Dan Fahey
duweapons@hotmail.com
c/o National Gulf War Resource Center
1224 M St., NW
Washington, DC 20005
U.S.A.

Fear of Falling

One often observes a fear of falling in people. Yet even the best of competitive figure skaters can fall. We also meet with falls in everyday life. One has to learn how to fall painlessly. Of what does a painless fall consist? It is a directed fall, which is to say that after losing balance we direct the body so that it lands on the side where the least damage will be done. As we fall, we relax our muscles and roll up, protecting the head. A fall that follows in accordance with these principles is not dangerous. On the other hand, trying desperately to avoid a fall often causes a painful spill at the last moment, when there is no chance to prepare for it.

Speed and Figure Skating, Z. Osinksi, W. Starosta.

In the early 1970's, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) started full-scale development and fielding of armor-piercing ammunition made of depleted uranium (DU), a radioactive and toxic heavy metal. Though depleted uranium proved effective at penetrating tank armor, several military reports warned the use of depleted uranium ammunition in combat might contaminate battlefields and cause health problems among exposed veterans and civilians. The genie was finally released in the 1991 Gulf War, when American tanks and aircraft shot more than 640,000 pounds of depleted uranium in southern Iraq and Kuwait.

Even before the shooting stopped, some stateside U.S. military officers expressed concern. Huge areas of southern Iraq and Kuwait were contaminated with depleted uranium dust and debris, and it was unclear who was responsible for the clean-up. It was evident that U.S. forces had not been trained about DU, and thousands of men and women were climbing on and entering contaminated equipment with no protective gear. Standing regulations required that servicemen and women exposed to DU receive medical testing, but such an undertaking posed significant logistical and budgetary problems. One officer recommended writing Gulf War after-action reports to downplay the environmental impacts and promote the future use of DU ammunition. The public and the media started asking questions, and a fear of falling set in.

In the early 1990's when thousands of Gulf War veterans started to report health problems, Pentagon spokesmen claimed only a few dozen veterans had been exposed to DU. As research on Gulf War veterans’ illnesses expanded in the mid-90's, the Army looked only at the health effects of embedded DU even though it knew thousands of veterans may have inhaled or ingested uranium dust. By 1995, the Army Environmental Policy Institute recommended using "forethought and data" to avoid the "excessive" costs of health care and disability payments for veterans poisoned by DU.

In 1998, the Department of Defense reluctantly admitted "thousands" of Gulf War veterans may have been unnecessarily exposed to DU. However, Pentagon spokesmen claimed that not even one of the more than 100,000 sick Gulf War veterans could possibly be ill from a depleted uranium exposure. At the same time, the Department of Defense summarily dismissed claims of DU-induced illness and cancer among populations living in contaminated areas of southern Iraq as mere propaganda.

After the Gulf War, the Pentagon deployed U.S. troops to Bosnia, Somalia, and the contaminated Udairi Training Range in Kuwait with no training on the hazards of depleted uranium. The Army developed a set of DU training videos and manuals in 1995, but it left the training package on the shelf. Supposedly military commanders believed images of soldiers in full protective suits carrying radiacmeters might scare people. In 1999, eight years after the Gulf War, the Pentagon ordered DU training to begin using a new, watered-down training program.

Increasing criticism of the Pentagon’s handling of the depleted uranium issue has recently triggered efforts to restore balance. Bernard Rostker, the Under-Secretary of the Army, asserts that concern about DU is engineered by Iraqi propaganda and pacifists. The Joint Chiefs of Staff describe DU as "extremely safe" in letters to Congressmen. Even though no one knows how much depleted uranium "thousands" of Gulf War veterans were exposed to, the Department of Defense paid the RAND Corporation to produce a report stating that not even one Gulf War veteran was exposed to enough depleted uranium to cause any health problems.

Despite the Pentagon’s substantial public relations efforts on DU, questions remain about the failures of Gulf War commanders to prevent DU exposures. Not surprisingly, however, Pentagon spokesmen refuse to identify the individuals and commands who neglected to warn American troops about the hazards of depleted uranium on the battlefield. No one is willing to explain why not even one veteran was tested after the war for a DU exposure, in blatant violation of U.S. Army safety regulations. To protect the careers of current and future military commanders, the U.S. Army has re-written its regulations to deny medical testing for soldiers exposed to DU in combat.

The Department of Defense has avoided an embarrassing fall over depleted uranium by convincing various federal committees and investigations that few veterans were exposed to DU and that not one veteran could be sick from a DU exposure. Currently, DoD promotes this message among NATO allies and United Nations agencies in an attempt to quiet increasing alarm about the release of a radioactive and chemically toxic waste in Kosovo. At the other extreme, the Yugoslav government offers exaggerated claims of depleted uranium’s potential hazards. In between the extremes of the Pentagon and the Yugoslav government exists a middle-ground reality that is slowing sinking into the international conscience: depleted uranium contamination on equipment and in the ground can potentially cause adverse health and environmental effects.

There is a clear and convincing need for further research on the health and environmental effects of the use of depleted uranium weapons. Current U.S. Army research finds depleted uranium may cause cancer, immune system and neurological disorders, and male and female reproductive problems. As depleted uranium weapons proliferate - most recently to China and Iran - and they are used in future conflicts, additional groups of veterans and civilians will be exposed to DU dust and debris. The sooner we fully understand the possible health and environmental impacts of depleted uranium, the greater our ability to address them.

U.S. military leaders are trying to ensure the unrestricted future use and proliferation of depleted uranium weapons while attempting to conceal their past failures to prevent DU exposures. Through public relations campaigns disguised as investigations, military leaders promote the illusion of the ‘clean’ war where no one dies, and no one gets sick. Contaminated battlefields and ailing veterans have disrupted the Pentagon’s balance and caused military leaders to take increasingly extreme positions about the risks of depleted uranium weapons. The more desperately the Pentagon leadership tries to avoid the moral and financial responsibilities of the use of depleted uranium weapons, the more painful the inevitable spill will be.

U.S. Study of Gulf War Veterans: Fact and Fiction

Since 1993, the U.S. Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs (VA) have studied a sub-group of 33 out of the 113 veterans who were in Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles when they were struck by depleted uranium rounds. Pentagon spokesmen assert none of the 33 ‘friendly fire’ veterans are suffering any health problems related to their DU exposure. OSAGWI(a), April 1999. By extension, DoD argues that no other Gulf War veterans could be sick from DU. This assurance is misleading, however, because:

Less than one-third of the ‘friendly fire’ survivors have been examined;
Medical testing and studies of the subgroup of 33 did not begin until two years after the veterans were exposed to DU;
The health of the additional 80 veterans is unknown;
At least three veterans who retain DU fragments and have not been previously studied or tested were recently identified;
A correlation between urinary uranium levels and health effects has been identified in the 33 veteran sub-group;
Army studies on rats implanted with DU confirm some of the findings of VA research on the 33 veteran sub-group; and
The health of the thousands of veterans exposed to depleted uranium dust when they climbed on and entered contaminated equipment has never been evaluated.

Until the entire cohort of 113 ‘friendly fire’ survivors is studied, any definitive conclusion about the health effects of depleted uranium on these veterans is premature.

During the 1991 Gulf War, depleted uranium rounds fired by American Abrams tanks penetrated six crewed Abrams tanks and 15 crewed Bradley Fighting Vehicles. AEPI, p. 79. Thirteen soldiers were killed in these incidents. AEPI, p. 79. An additional 113 soldiers survived, 50 of whom were wounded. OSAGWI, p. 8. AEPI, p. 79. Six of the Bradley’s were buried in Saudi Arabia because they were too contaminated to ship back to the United States. AMCCOM-SWA, p. 6, letter O. The remaining Abrams and Bradleys were shipped back to the United States for decontamination and disposal.

According to Army Regulations 40-5 and 40-14, which were applicable during the 1991 Gulf War, all 113 of the soldiers who were in vehicles struck by DU rounds should have been medically tested to determine their level of exposure (see DoD Analysis II). However, not one of these veterans - not even veterans wounded by depleted uranium fragments - was provided medical testing until the DU Program was established in 1993. Therefore, there is no baseline data for this group, and no clear indication whether these veterans may have suffered short term health problems related to their known heavy exposure to DU.

The January 1993 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report, Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal with Depleted Uranium Contamination, specifically recommended that all veterans who survived DU-friendly fire incidents should receive medical testing and surveillance. GAO, p. 7. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO’s recommendation. GAO, p. 37. Yet for reasons that have never been explained, the Army Surgeon General’s Office selected a sub-group of only 33 veterans (29% of the total) for enrollment in the DU Program. GAO, p. 37. RAND, p. 51. Despite the fact that more than two years elapsed until the Army and the VA started to examine less than one-third of the veterans who survived DU-friendly fire incidents, U.S. Army Colonel Eric Daxon describes the Army Surgeon General’s action as a "good news story" which demonstrates the Army’s commitment to its soldiers. OSAGWI(a), April 1999.

The sub-group of 33 consists of 22 veterans who were wounded by DU fragments, and 11 veterans who had only an inhalation and ingestion DU exposure. Sixteen of the veterans in the 33 sub-group currently retain DU fragments in their bodies. When 29 veterans from the sub-group were re-examined in 1997, the majority of the individuals who retained DU fragments had elevated urinary uranium levels. RAND, p. 51. This indicates imbedded DU fragments are oxidized in body fluids and transported in the bloodstream. U.S. Army researchers studying imbedded DU fragments in rats report DU in the bloodstream deposits in the bones, kidneys, lymph nodes, muscles, testicles, and brain. AFRRI, 1999.

As previously noted, the first urine samples from the 33 veteran sub-group were not taken until 1993, two years after these veterans were exposed to DU. The existence of at least 80 other ‘friendly fire’ survivors was first reported in the March 1998 Depleted Uranium Case Narrative. Case Narrative, p. 55. Three weeks after the release of the Case Narrative, Bernard Rostker announced that OSAGWI would try to find 80 additional veterans and enroll them in the DU Program study. Rostker, p. 3. At least 3 veterans retaining DU fragments have recently been identified during OSAGWI’s outreach. Eight years after they were wounded by DU fragments, these veterans were provided their first test for urinary uranium. Since 50 veterans were wounded in DU ‘friendly fire’ incidents, it is possible other veterans retaining DU fragments have not yet been examined and tested.

The Department of Defense presents the 1993 urinary uranium results in the 33 veteran subgroup as baseline data for other researchers to use. The value of this data is limited, though, and it may adversely affect the interpretation of research findings and application of "the existing scientific literature on the health effects of depleted uranium" to exposed Gulf War veterans. The RAND report in particular may have been influenced by incomplete baseline data:

Comparisons of exposure levels between rats and humans are difficult, but researchers indicate that the rats with the smallest number of DU pellets had a higher urinary uranium level than Gulf War veterans with embedded fragments, who were among the most highly exposed Gulf War veterans. RAND, p. 52.

Considering the urinary uranium levels for some of the veterans with embedded fragments were not measured until two years after exposure, and that additional veterans with embedded DU fragments are now being tested for the first time, it appears uncertain whether the rat studies involve higher amounts of DU than Gulf War veterans were exposed to. The baseline data for the veterans is incomplete. Nonetheless, research on rats implanted with DU has shed light on the possible health effects of DU in humans.

Some of the findings of U.S. Army studies on rats confirm findings of VA research on the 33 veteran sub-group. First, neither the Army studies on rats nor VA research on the veterans show evidence of kidney effects. AFRRI, 1999. RAND, p. 51-52. Second, both the Army and VA find possible neurocognitive effects from imbedded DU. AFRRI, 1999. VA(b), March 1997. Third, Army studies find DU in the bloodstream deposits in the testes, and VA research in 1997 found DU in the semen of 5 out of 22 Gulf War veterans. AFRRI, 1999. VA(b), March 1997. Fourth, Army studies show DU causes tumors in rats, and at least one veteran in the 33 sub-group has developed a tumor near the site where he was wounded by DU. AFRRI, 1999.

The neurocognitive function of the 33 veteran sub-group has been tested several times. Dr. Melissa McDiarmid, director of the DU Program, states:

The first study done in 1993-1994 found a relationship between elevated urine uranium and lowered performance on computerized neurocognitive measures. The second study found that the reading scores from the Wide Range Achievement Test - 3rd Revision could be used as an estimate of pre-morbid functioning. The third study, a follow-up to the first, re-assessed individuals wounded with DU shrapnel and compared their neurocognitive test performance to controls. The third study confirmed the first and showed a relationship between neurocognitive performance and urine uranium. VA(b), March 1997.

Of this testing, the RAND report states: "As a group these individuals performed normally on standard tests of attention, memory, and problems solving. However, there was a statistical relationship between elevated urine uranium and lowered efficiency and accuracy." RAND, p. 52. Interestingly, U.S. Army research on rats shows "the possibility that physiological changes occur in the brain with chronic exposure to DU fragments, which could contribute to neurological deficits." AFFRI(a), 1999. Both U.S. Army and VA research indicate imbedded DU may cause neurocognitive problems.

U.S. Army researchers report depleted uranium deposits in the testes of male rats implanted with DU fragments. AFRRI, 1999. Several studies have identified chromosomal aberrations in male uranium miners and testicular damage in rats fed uranium. RAND, p. 67. VA(a), November 1997. DoD Analysis II, p. 8-9. With these facts in mind, VA researchers tested Gulf War veterans’ semen for depleted uranium. According to Dr. McDiarmid, "Five of the first 22 participants had semen uranium values greater than the limit of detection. All 5 were exposed cases. Four controls had no detectable uranium in semen." VA(b), March 1997.

Along with finding depleted uranium in veterans’ semen six years after their exposure, Dr. McDiarmid found abnormal reproductive hormone levels:

Reproductive hormone levels were assessed with no linear correlation observed for LH, FSH, prolactin and testosterone with urinary uranium levels. However, we did observe a seven fold mean difference in urinary uranium concentration between the low and high prolactin groups and a three-fold difference in urinary uranium concentration between the FSH groups. VA(b), March 1997.

Dr. McDiarmid reports approximately 17 normal births occurred among female partners of the 33 veteran sub-group. RAND, p. 67. However, RAND notes "[t]here were too few offspring among the 33 veterans with possible embedded DU to draw any conclusions" about possible reproductive effects. RAND, p. 67. Until the entire cohort of 113 ‘friendly fire’ vets and others known to have been exposed to DU are evaluated, no firm conclusions can be made about the reproductive health of veterans and civilians exposed to DU.

U.S. Army researchers are conducting the first animal studies looking specifically at the carcinogenicity of depleted uranium. A recent peer-reviewed, published report notes:

Our data demonstrate for the first time that a DU compound can transform human cells to the tumorigenic phenotype, similar to results observed with some nickel compounds. Isolated DU transformants form anchorage-independent colonies, produce tumors when injected into athymic mice, express the k-ras oncogene, and have an altered phosphorylation of the Rb tumor-suppressor protein. Based on these in vitro results, the carcinogenic potential of internalized DU remains a concern and warrants additional studies with experimental animals. AFFRI(b), August 1998.

Interestingly, this study was not part of RAND’s review of "the existing scientific literature on the health effects of depleted uranium." RAND, p. v.

At least one of the 33 veteran sub-group has developed a tumor, though this is not acknowledged or discussed in the RAND report or by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses. Jerry Wheat was wounded in his left-upper back and neck by DU fragments on February 26, 1991, when his Bradley Fighting Vehicle was hit by two 120mm DU rounds. A year after he returned from the war, Jerry Wheat’s father informed him that he had been wounded by depleted uranium. In November 1998, VA doctors removed a tumor from Jerry Wheat’s left humerus (bone in upper left arm). In a phone interview with the author, Jerry Wheat, now 31 years old, stated: "I asked the VA to send the tumor to a private physician for further testing, but they refused to release it. They told me it was benign, but they wouldn’t say if my DU exposure might have caused it."

The findings of the study of the 33 veterans in the DU Program are not as definitive as the Department of Defense would like us to believe. For several years the Department of Defense has asserted the lack of current kidney problems in 33 out of the 113 ‘friendly fire’ survivors is proof that "DU exposure has not produced any medically detectable effects." Rostker, March 1998. Despite such assurances, ongoing research on rats and veterans is finding health effects related to DU exposure. The extent to which this information can be applied to veterans and civilians who inhaled or ingested DU dust remains unclear. What is clear is the reluctance of the Department of Defense to admit any health effects could result from the use of depleted uranium ammunition.

The Fundamental Problem With the RAND DU Report

The Office of the Special Assistant (OSAGWI) and the Department of Defense are promoting RAND’s DU report, A Review of the Scientific Literature As It Pertains to Gulf War Illnesses Vol. 7: Depleted Uranium, as conclusive proof that exposure to depleted uranium does not cause any health problems. OSAGWI is the Department of Defense office reporting on Gulf War toxic exposures, including depleted uranium. OSAGWI is using the RAND report not only to argue that not one Gulf War veteran could be sick from depleted uranium poisoning, but also to assert that the use of depleted uranium munitions in current and future conflicts poses no risk to human health. This position contradicts many pre- and post-Gulf War military reports and documents which acknowledge health risks to armed forces and civilian populations following the use of DU ammunition in combat.

The central argument of the RAND report is that not a single Gulf War veteran was likely to have ingested or inhaled enough depleted uranium to cause health problems. A news release from OSAGWI states the RAND report proves there is "no evidence of harmful health effects directly linked to depleted uranium exposures at levels experienced by Gulf War veterans," OSAGWI(a), April 1999, emphasis added. At the press conference held by OSAGWI to release the RAND report, Dr. Ross Anthony, an economist who coordinated the RAND DU report, stated: "At the levels of exposure that I’m aware of, and unless there’s something that I’m not aware of, the scientific literature does not find that there is a negative health effect." OSAGWI(a), April 1999, emphasis added. The RAND report adds:

Thus, based on the general literature, exposure to uranium of a large enough dose to be of radiological significance seems unlikely in the Gulf War; however, other groups such as the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) (1998) and CHPPM (1998) are evaluating the level of exposure to DU in the Gulf War. RAND, p. 3, emphasis added.

The assumption that not one Gulf War veteran could have been exposed to enough depleted uranium to cause any health problems is inherently flawed and it undermines the overall conclusions of the RAND report. The fact is no one can state with any reliable degree of certainty how much depleted uranium individual Gulf War veterans may have inhaled or ingested in single and multiple exposure incidents during and after the war. The baseline data for such an assessment is missing: no risk assessments of depleted uranium on the battlefield were performed after the war and a only a small sub-group of the veterans believed to be most heavily exposed were tested and examined two years after their exposure.

During the July 13, 1999 Presidential Special Oversight Board (PSOB) hearing, Dr. Naomi Harley articulated the contradictions contained in the RAND report. Dr. Harley is an authority in the area of radiation physics, and one of the authors of the RAND report. While Dr. Harley acknowledged that current exposure assessments are "poor," she also stated "no one was breathing high amounts of DU in the war." PSOB. Dr. Harley argued there is "zero possibility" of health effects from depleted uranium "as exposed in these wars." Dr. Harley did not state the basis for her exposure estimates; nor did any of the Oversight Board members ask her.

The only exposure level mentioned by Dr. Harley during the hearing was an occupational inhalation dose limit of 2 mg of DU in one day, which she stated was unlikely to have occurred. The RAND report describes an inhalation of 2 mg of DU as an "unreasonable amount." RAND, p. 39. The RAND report also states it would be "unlikely" an ingestion exposure would be as high as 1 mg in one day. RAND, p. 49. However, OSAGWI states 24 to 52 mg could be inhaled in a worst case estimate of a single exposure incident. OSAGWI, p. 161-163. Therefore, it appears at least theoretically possible that some veterans could have inhaled or ingested much higher levels of DU during single or multiple exposure incidents than RAND and Dr. Harley were led to believe was possible.

In addition to under-estimating the amount of depleted uranium veterans may have inhaled or ingested, Dr. Harley and RAND incorrectly applied occupational dose rate standards to Gulf War veterans. RAND, p. 55. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that occupational workers receive training, wear protective clothing, and undergo medical testing if they are exposed to depleted uranium. 10 C.F.R. 20. Since the overwhelming majority of Gulf War veterans were never trained about DU, wore no protective gear, and were never tested for DU exposure, they can not be considered occupational workers. This is confirmed by the U.S. Army: "The Army conservatively treats its tank crews and maintenance personnel as members of the general public with respect to radiation exposure." TACOM, p. 6.

The daily intake (inhalation and/or ingestion) limit for DU for members of the general public set by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is just 0.2 mg per day, or ten percent of the occupational dose limit. BRL, p. 18. When a daily intake of 0.2 mg is compared to the Army’s estimate of an intake of 24 to 52 mg of DU in a "worst case" single exposure, the health risks may be more easily put into perspective. RAND and Dr. Harley incorrectly evaluated the severity of Gulf War veterans’ exposures based on occupational exposure limits and inaccurate exposure estimates.

Interviews of Gulf War veterans conducted by OSAGWI and the General Accounting Office confirm many veterans may have had multiple, unprotected exposures to depleted uranium dust and debris. It is difficult to estimate the exposure in each incident these veterans have described. The cumulative doses from multiple exposure incidents could have been minimal, or quite significant. At this point in time it is virtually impossible to determine to any reliable degree of certainty whether the thousands of veterans who climbed on thousands of pieces of contaminated equipment may have each inhaled or ingested a cumulative dose of 1 mg of DU, or 50 mg.

Some of the significant information contained in OSAGWI interviews is noticeably missing from the body of OSAGWI’s DU report. These interviews (called "Lead Sheets" or "Lead Reports") can only be found online in the Endnotes section of OSAGWI’s Environmental Exposure Report on Depleted Uranium in the Gulf (found at http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du/). As the following stories point out, the RAND report authors including Dr. Harley may have been misled by the Department of Defense about the scope and severity of depleted uranium exposures. Keep in mind that DoD and RAND state not one veteran could have inhaled or ingested enough depleted uranium to cause any health problems:

Sergeant, 58th Combat Engineers: "[The Sgt.] said that he and others in the unit were involved in leveling "Camp Freedom" north of Kuwait City, which apparently had been garrisoned by the Iraqis. They frequently bulldozed or cleared bunkers and other former Iraqi positions, and moved or cleared away some Iraqi equipment. Like many other soldiers in his unit, SGT [redacted] crawled inside destroyed Iraqi armor and vehicles. Some guys took souvenirs, but most of these were confiscated upon their departure . . . [The veteran and his wife] said that they were aware that ‘something had happened’ over there that was affecting their health, and the health of others in the unit. They thought they would eventually ‘get over it.’ [The Sgt.] had received a mailing from the VA re: Gulf War Illness, but was too busy in his construction job to go in and get checked out for problems. He also distrusts the VA." OSAGWI; Lead Sheet 5721; Aug. 14, 1997.

Logistics Assistance Representative, 1st Armored Division: "He was also involved with other contaminated tanks . . . They had prewar guidance fax’d to them that instructed them to seal the tank and move downwind. It never addressed what to do about ammunition on board. [He] provided me with a copy of the prewar LAR BDAR DU guidance fax. He said that he tried to show the CG (General [redacted]) the fax when he was talking to him (apparently he knew the CG because their wives worked together). He was quickly hushed up by the LAO (Logistics Assistance Officer), Col. [redacted] who stated something along the lines of not wanting to scare people. The fax informed the LARs that if a tank was suspected of being contaminated with DU dust, it should be roped off and access should be limited to prevent scattering of the DU . . . [He] went on to say that about a year and a half after his tumor was removed he had an unofficial whole body test done at a nuclear power plant and the technician was surprised at the low potassium level. He was told that uranium strips the body of potassium. According to [him] normal values are 4.5 to 5.5 and his is 0.2. He apparently did a letter writing campaign with Nunn and Rockefeller. He says he was told by someone in the AMC Surgeon General’s office to stop stirring things up . . . He said that [redacted] is a retired LAR who has been real sick. Apparently [redacted] had more dealings with DU contaminated equipment (downloading munitions) than any other LAR." OSAGWI; Lead Sheet 5685; Aug. 13, 1997.

Sergeant First Class, 144th Service and Supply Company, Army National Guard (NJ): "[H]e indicated that his people frequently also had to enter the tanks/Bradleys to download munitions. Initially, they did not know the equipment was contaminated and did not take any precautions . . . He said he thought they processed close to twenty contaminated vehicles, excluding one T55 Soviet tank. After they were notified some vehicles could be contaminated, his personnel wore leather gloves (they did not change them out), and surgical type masks. They typically took a shower every day but might wear the same set of fatigues for 2-3 days. He indicated that they would routinely wash their hands before eating. He indicated that the outside of the vehicles were not particularly dirty/dusty. However, the insides had 1/4 to 1/2 inch of fine "dust." He could not say whether or not the dust was from the fires or from the desert. He said that the hatches of the vehicles were always open when they received the vehicles. He indicated that the dust was stirred up as his personnel walked climbed through the vehicles." OSAGWI; Lead Report 14200; Jan. 19, 1998.

Sergeant, 144th Service and Supply Company, Army National Guard (NJ): "He indicated that they frequently climbed on or in damaged equipment to salvage or cannibalize parts from the damaged equipment for other units. He said it was not officially authorized but if another unit needed the parts, they would attempt to recover them from the damage equipment . . . He just said that everything was dusty. He estimated that they worked around the contaminated equipment for 45 to 60 days. He further estimated that the typical time inside a Bradley as 10 minutes versus 15 minutes for an Abrams. He estimated he went into the damaged equipment 20 times. He said everytime they had to move the equipment, they were around it for approximately 1 hr and they had to move some of the equipment several times. He indicated that even after they were notified that some of the equipment was contaminated, he still entered without protective equipment. He indicated that his only medical problems were skin welps. He indicated that he periodically reacts to unspecified causes and quickly develops skin welps. He was seen at the Boston VA. He has a son with medical problems. He did not elaborate." OSAGWI; Lead Report 14316; Feb. 16, 1998.

In-Theater Civilian, AMCCOM Radiation Control Team: "[He] said that soon after arrival he had a meeting with Major [redacted] who informed him that there were many vehicles that were contaminated. Many soldiers were contaminated when they boarded to download munitions. They salvaged anything they could salvage and wore no protective clothing or mask in the process. He said that none of the transporters knew of the hazard except for in the few cases when radioactive warning stickers had been placed on contaminated systems . . . [He] said that at one site, he believes it was the 13 April tank fire, had people "hip deep" in DU. He said there was a colonel and 8-10 troops contaminated. He reiterated that prior to their arrival there was no fence and control at KKMC. He said they had no clue about contamination. People not even related to the site were coming in to tour the battle damaged equipment . . . When he first returned he had some respiratory problems which he attributes to the fine sand. Apparently this manifests itself as sinus problems which occasionally reoccur . . . He has no sores, but does have occasional shortness of breath." OSAGWI; Lead Sheet 5700; Aug. 14, 1997.

Sergeant, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized): "After unloading all the ammunition and personal items, the maintenance personnel stripped off usable parts and highly sensitive equipment. The maintenance sergeant in charge of the recovery operation told us that he had no prior knowledge of the potential for DU contamination in these vehicles. He told us that at the time he believed the vehicles had been hit by Abrams tanks, and that he was aware of rumors that the tanks fired DU rounds, but information on the use of DU, its risks, and necessary precautions had not been a part of his training or included in guidance provided to him. He said he had not been provided at the time of the incident, or since then, a medical evaluation for radiation exposure. While he could not remember the exact number of people involved in the recovery operation, he was not aware of anyone else involved receiving any medical attention. During our June 1992 interview, the maintenance sergeant told us that this was the first time that he had been informed that these vehicles had been contaminated by DU and that he might have been exposed to some level of radiation." GAO, p. 15-16.

Sergeant, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized): "He believed the damaged vehicle had been hit by Abrams tank fire, but he did not know it had been contaminated. He said he was unaware that Abrams tanks fired DU ammunition. This maintenance sergeant told us that after the vehicle was repaired, he had stayed in it, along with other personnel, for several days until the ground war was over. He said that he had never been told that he might have been exposed to DU; nor had he been provided a medical evaluation for radiation exposure." GAO, p. 16.

Master Sergeant, 354th EMS, US Air Force: "Several incidents. Bad lots of ammo - the round would burn slowly after being hit by the firing pin - this resulted in rounds being stuck in the gun barrel [of an A-10] . . . No protective gear was worn when these were being dislodged. No prior training with DU rounds. Some rounds were broken open, crushed, cracked after the misfire. He cannot estimate how much DU dust there was. He still hasn’t received any DU training (now working on F-15s). He is concerned about his exposure to DU, based on handling the misfired rounds and cleaning out the barrels. He is also concerned about the Air Force’s failure to provide training even today. He had a CCEP exam, and they ran tons of test - blood work, neurology, etc. He has a number of symptoms, and wants the VA/military to acknowledge that war is bad for the average human being." OSAGWI; Lead Report 12226; August 19, 1997.

Lt. Colonel, Battle Damage and Assessment Team Co-Leader: "He said that 3 of the first 4 Bradleys they checked out were fratricide cases from 4-7th Cavalry. After this he established procedures whereby he verified with a radiac meter before entering any destroyed vehicles. His team of six soldiers, including himself, took all available precautions when working in and around DU-contaminated systems. He said they each had two complete sets of MOPP gear plus a trunk with industrial masks and yellow radiation suits, including hoods and booties. They didn’t enter any "hot" vehicles without being fully suited up. He didn’t even let any of the soldiers on his team sleep on the ground. They always slept on cots. Ltc. [redacted] said that 27 or 28 major components were missing from the first four Bradleys he entered. So, he knows that maintenance soldiers had been in there scrounging parts. He said that one vehicle they looked at from the 3rd Armored Division was hot despite the fact that the Division NBC Officer had certified the vehicle as no hazard. He ended up having to get his General (General [redacted] who was the senior AMC representative in country) and the ADC, General [redacted] together along with the Division NBC Officer to check the vehicle again. The Division Commander, General [redacted] had questioned Major [redacted]’s technical proficiency. When the Division NBC Officer went entered [sic] the vehicle with his radiac meter he immediately let out an exclamation and departed the vehicle. General [redacted] apologized to Major [redacted] for doubting his assessment . . . Some of the destroyed equipment was just left in the desert and [his] team had to find it. On the occasion that there was someone from the unit (to which the vehicle belonged) he would inform the soldier that the vehicle was contaminated with DU and should not be entered . . . Ltc. [redacted] said that he knows that the 24th Infantry Division direct support guys who retrieved the tanks they had intentionally destroyed, entered the vehicles when they retrieved them. He said that there was a lot of destroyed Iraqi equipment out there, but that he didn’t enter it. He said that it seemed like every third Iraqi tank had a hole from a DU round in it. He didn’t have any gear with which to mark DU-contaminated equipment. Apparently the senior NCO from the other six-man BDAT team, MSG [redcacted] sometimes took a more cavalier attitude towards the hazards . . . On one occasion he entered an Abrams tank which he knew was DU-contaminated, without any protective measures. When one of the hatches slammed shut a lot of dust was stirred up." OSAGWI; Lead Report 15330; March 5, 1998.

Lt. Colonel, Battle Damage and Assessment Team: "He said that in some cases they wore face masks (when the vehicle looked burned out), but sometimes they didn’t. The first couple of times they entered vehicles was for body retrieval . . . When they had investigated all the vehicles they could find on the battlefield they went to KKMC to check for vehicles there. Upon finding vehicles that had been struck by DU rounds at KKMC he informed the NCOIC of the soldiers from the 144th working with the equipment that some of the systems they were crawling around were contaminated with DU dust . . . He was at Doha checking the condition of the tanks which burned in the fire. While there he interfaced primarily with the Regimental XO (who he said was awarded the soldiers medal for actions on the day of the explosion) . . . He said that his team received training at the Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL) prior to going to the Gulf. They were trained to handle DU and provided with masks, gloves, and respirators." OSAGWI; Lead Report 5681; August 13, 1997.

In-Theater Civilian, AMCCOM Radiation Control Team: "[He] said that initially there were a lot of people in and out of the equipment at KKMC including BDAT (Battle Damage and Assessment Teams), curiosity seekers and people seeking parts . . . Later on, he returned after the 11 July fire at Doha . . . [He] saw "Young enlisteds out sweeping the area with brooms (after the UXOs and debris had been cleared). [He] said he told [redacted] "That’s not something they should be doing." One evening a "full bird" (colonel, not further identified) asked [him] "what do you think about this? (the recovery effort). [He] says he told the colonel, "I wouldn’t do it that way." The Colonel nodded and walked off. [He] left the next day (on or about the 25th) and doesn’t know if any changes were made." OSAGWI; Lead Sheet 5698; July 7 and Aug. 8, 1997.

Staff Sergeant, Echo Troop, 2/11 Armored Cavalry Regiment: "Even as a tanker, [he] said he was told very little about DU. The only special instructions he remembered before the fire was being warned not to knock the metal tip off the DU round while handling it in the tank, because that would mean the entire tank would have to be sealed up. However, he doesn’t remember being warned of any battlefield hazard posed by DU, and just knew it was ‘bad mamba-jamba’ that you shouldn’t handle. When I asked if any of the lessons learned from the Doha accident and other potential DU exposures had filtered down to the troops, he didn’t have any reason to think that they had. Even the armor troops still know very little about DU." OSAGWI; Lead Report 6473; Oct. 20, 1997.

Lt. Colonel, Regimental Engineer Staff Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment: "Explosions and the ‘cook-off’ of ammunition [at Doha] continued into the night of 11 July and the fires eventually burned themselves out sometime on the morning of 12 July . . . The explosions spread DU penetrators, both whole and in pieces, throughout the north compound. The fires produced billowing black and white clouds of smoke that rose hundreds of feet into the air, and drifted predominately slowly to the east south-east across portions of both compounds towards Kuwait City . . . As we began clearing the 2nd Squadron’s motor pool, on about 19 July, a team from Army Material Command (AMC) arrived and began asking questions about DU penetrators and occasionally checking personnel with a radiation detector as they came out of the motor pool area. This was the first time anyone showed an interest or concern with DU . . . I estimate I personally handled over two dozen rods or pieces of rods. Most of them had a black sooty and/or powdery coating over them . . . Once an area was deemed clear of UXO, Squadron troops would come in to physically clean an area of all debris . . . Typically the soldiers would strip off their BDU top and work in T-shirts and gloves. They would use engineer equipment (a bucket loader, back hoe or road grader) to scrape the large pieces of debris into piles, hand pick up smaller pieces, and then use sweep brooms to clean the concrete surface in the motor pool. There would be as many as 50 soldiers ‘on line’ sweeping down a cleared area of very small debris, sand, and dust. Again, as with the UXO clearing, these soldiers carried and drank water continuously throughout their cleaning efforts . . . At no time did anyone in the Regiment’s senior chain of command address radiation health risks with me . . . At no time did anyone provide protective suits, surgical gloves, respirators, or surgical masks for personnel to wear during clearing or cleaning operations . . . Why was the U.S. Embassy not notified by staff(s) in Saudi Arabia of the potential radiological hazards of the smoke from the fires that was drifting towards Kuwait City? Why did the CENTCOM Commander in Chief [Norman Schwarzkopf] and members of his staff, who overflew the north compound during a visit to the Regiment and observed the clearing and cleaning personnel in only T-shirts, body armor, and kevlar not question the exposure of troops to radiation risks? . . . I would like to be notified of any and all surveys, reports, findings or written documents concerning DU and radiation at Doha, Kuwait. Additionally, because of the repeated assurances that there were no radiological hazards during these clearing operations, I request that all former members of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 146th EOD Detachment, and ARCENT Support Units stationed at Camp Doha during July and August 1991, and who were possibly exposed to DU radiation during the clearing and cleaning operations, be notified of the potential health risks, no matter how slight." OSAGWI; Lead Report 15493; March 16, 1998.

The stories told by these veterans and civilians illustrate a number of important points:

Most ground forces had little to no knowledge of the use of DU munitions and the possible presence of DU contamination on destroyed equipment.
Many veterans may have been exposed to DU dust multiple times as a result of climbing on and entering destroyed Iraqi and American equipment during combat operations, to look for souvenirs, to scavenge spare parts, and to transport destroyed equipment.
Some veterans and civilians who believe they were exposed to depleted uranium developed health problems after their return from the Persian Gulf region.
Some well intentioned civilians and at least one officer tried to warn commanders about the dangers of DU contamination, but they were reprimanded and their pleas were ignored.

The veteran’s experiences also highlight the absurdity of OSAGWI and RAND’s assertion that it is impossible any Gulf War veterans were exposed to enough depleted uranium to cause health problems. The RAND report is built on a faulty foundation of inadequate dose estimates provided by the U.S. Army and OSAGWI. RAND also incorrectly applied occupational intake standards to soldiers, which are ten times higher than the intake limits for members of the general public. For these reasons, the RAND report is inadequate for use in assessing the possible relationship between depleted uranium exposures and Gulf War veterans’ health problems.

Some Additional Reports Not Reviewed by RAND

In DoD Analysis II, I listed more than one hundred studies and reports on the health effects of depleted uranium and uranium not reviewed by RAND. Some of the reports not reviewed by RAND directly address health effects of depleted uranium. RAND’s failure to conduct a thorough review of the scientific literature may have resulted in inaccurate and incomplete conclusions. Some additional studies not reviewed by RAND include:

Uranium, Reproductive Effects. Domingo, Jose L. Handbook of Hazardous Materials, Academic Press, 1993. Pages 705 - 711. This study states, in part: "Indeed, preliminary evidence has indicated that all counties in New Mexico with commercially significant levels of uranium, or uranium mining and milling operations, are also characterized by high mortality rates for gastric cancer . . . With regard to the reproductive toxicity of uranium, the data indicate that uranium would not cause any adverse effect on reproduction at the concentrations usually ingested in drinking water. However, since at 10mg/kg/day of uranyl acetate dihydrate the pregnancy rate is significantly decreased, we intend to investigate the cause of this effect and whether or not it may be totally or partially reversible."

Urinary and serum mutagenicity studies with rats implanted with depleted uranium or tantalum pellets. Miller, A.C. et al. Mutagenesis, 1998. Vol. 13; No. 6; pp. 643-648. The study states, in part: "In depleted uranium-implanted animals, urine mutagenicity increased in a dose- and time-dependent manner demonstrating a strong positive correlation with urine uranium levels (r = 0.995, P<0.001). There was no mutagenic enhancement of any bacterial strain detected in the sera of animals implanted with either depleted uranium or tantallum pellets. The results suggest that uranium content in the urine is correlated with urine mutagenicity and that urinary mutagenicity might be used as a biomarker to detect exposure to depleted uranium."

Transformation of Human Osteoblast Cells to the Tumorigenic Phenotype by Depleted Uranium-Uranyl Chloride. Miller, A.C. et al. Environmental Health Perspectives, August 1998. Vol. 106; Number 8; pp. 465-471. This study states, in part: "We report the ability of DU-uranyl chloride transformants to transform immortalized human osteoblastic cells (HOS) to the tumorigenic phenotype. DU-uranyl chloride transformants are characterized by anchorage-independent growth, tumor formation in nude mice, expression of high levels of the k-ras oncogene, reduced production of the Rb tumor suppressor protein, and elevated levels of sister chromatid exchanges per cell . . . This is the first report showing that a DU compound caused human cell transformation to the neoplastic phenotype. Although additional studies are needed to determine if protracted DU exposure produces tumors in vivo, the implication from these in vitro results is that the risk of cancer induction from internalized DU exposure may be comparable to other biologically reactive and carcinogenic heavy metal compounds (e.g. nickel)."

Electrophysiological Changes in Hippocampal Slices Isolated from Rats Embedded with Depleted Uranium Fragments. Pellmar, T.C. et al. NeuroToxicology, 1999. This study states, in part: "Six months after implantation, synaptic potentials in DU-exposed in DU-exposed tissue were less capable of eliciting spikes (E/S coupling). At 12 months, amplitudes of synaptic potentials were significantly increased in tissue from DU treated rats compared to Ta controls. E/S coupling was reduced . . . This study raises the possibility that physiological changes occur in the brain with chronic exposure to DU fragments, which could contribute to neurological deficits."

Internal Bone Seeking Radionuclides and Monocyte Counts. Bertell, Rosalie PhD. International Perspectives in Public Health, 1993. Volume 9; pp. 21-26. This study states, in part: "Statistically significant monocyte [white blood cell] depression is reported in four populations with internal exposure to bone-seeking radionuclides (uranium, radium, thorium, lead 210, strontium 90 and plutonium) at relatively low dose levels within current maximum permissible doses for the public. Both the proportion of the population with monocytopenia and the severity of the depression appear dose related. Secondary effects of monocytopenia are iron deficient anemia and impaired cellular immune system."

Embryotoxicity and teratogenicity of uranium in mice following subcutaneous administration of uranyl acetate. Bosque, M.A. et al. Biol. Trace Elem. Res., 1993. 36: 109-118.

Evaluation of the perinatal and postnatal effects of uranium in mice upon oral administration. Domingo, J.L. et al. Arch. Environ. Health, 1989. 44: 395-398.

Study of the Effects of Uranium on Kidney Function. Moss, M.A. Research Report, Atomic Energy Control Board, Ottawa, Canada, 1989.

The Chemical Toxicity of Uranium with Special Reference to Effects on the Kidney and the Use of Urine for Biological Monitoring. Stopps, G.J. et al. Research Report, Atomic Energy Control Board, Ottawa, Canada, 1982.

These studies report on health effects of internalized depleted uranium and uranium compounds.

All these studies were available for review before the RAND report was released in April 1999. Why weren’t they reviewed by RAND?

DU Hazard Warnings Ignored

The End Notes section of OSAGWI’s on-line Environmental Exposure Report on DU in the Gulf (http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du/) contains interviews with Gulf War veterans and civilian contractors. Several of the interviews (called "Lead Sheets" or "Lead Reports") mention incidents where well-meaning individuals tried to alert senior officers of the hazards of depleted uranium. Mention of the attempted warnings is noticably missing from the body of the OSAGWI DU report. These statements, combined with pre-war messages discussed in DoD Analysis II, offer the most conclusive proof yet that senior commanders may have intentionally withheld warnings and ignored safety measures in order to avoid ‘scaring’ troops. These ignored warnings are one stone OSAGWI seems uninterested in turning:

Lt. Colonel James E. Martin, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Regimental NBC Officer: "I read him the entries from the SUPCOM LOC Doha Sequence of Events log indicating SUPCOM knew, the afternoon of the fire, that there was a hazard from breathable Alpha radiation, and that the Regiment had been notified to treat the affected area as a chemical hazard area. LTC [Martin] said "I can tell you I wasn’t aware of that." He said that the previous NBC Officer, Major [redacted] had left on 1 July, and he himself had only arrived in Doha that morning (on 11 July) . . . When Maj. [now Lt. Col.Martin] saw the Fox vehicles out monitoring around the perimeter of the North Compound, and in the South Compound, he commented to Col. [Bacevich’s] staff (the one’s present) that Foxes were of little value in detecting Alpha radiation (DU). The unit XO "took him aside" and told him, in effect, to butt out, since the Regimental Commander had directed the action (Fox monitoring). He could only speculate on the reasons behind this course of action." OSAGWI; Lead Report 15517; March 18, 1998.

In-Theater Civilian, AMCCOM Radiation Control Team: "[He] said that initially there were a lot of people in and out of the equipment at KKMC including BDAT (Battle Damage and Assessment Teams), curiosity seekers and people seeking parts . . . Later on, he returned after the 11 July fire at Doha . . . [He] saw "Young enlisteds out sweeping the area with brooms (after the UXOs and debris had been cleared). [He] said he told [redacted] "That’s not something they should be doing." One evening a "full bird" (colonel, not further identified) asked [him] "what do you think about this? (the recovery effort). [He] says he told the colonel, "I wouldn’t do it that way." The Colonel nodded and walked off. [He] left the next day (on or about the 25th) and doesn’t know if any changes were made." OSAGWI; Lead Sheet 5698; July 7 and Aug. 8, 1997.

Logistics Assistance Representative, 1st Armored Division: "He was also involved with other contaminated tanks . . . They had prewar guidance fax’d to them that instructed them to seal the tank and move downwind. It never addressed what to do about ammunition on board. [He] provided me with a copy of the prewar LAR BDAR DU guidance fax. He said that he tried to show the CG (General [redacted]) the fax when he was talking to him (apparently he knew the CG because their wives worked together). He was quickly hushed up by the LAO (Logistics Assistance Officer), Col. [redacted] who stated something along the lines of not wanting to scare people. The fax informed the LARs that if a tank was suspected of being contaminated with DU dust, it should be roped off and access should be limited to prevent scattering of the DU . . . [He] went on to say that about a year and a half after his tumor was removed he had an unofficial whole body test done at a nuclear power plant and the technician was surprised at the low potassium level. He was told that uranium strips the body of potassium. According to [him] normal values are 4.5 to 5.5 and his is 0.2. He apparently did a letter writing campaign with Nunn and Rockefeller. He says he was told by someone in the AMC Surgeon General’s office to stop stirring things up . . . He said that [redacted] is a retired LAR who has been real sick. Apparently [redacted] had more dealings with DU contaminated equipment (downloading munitions) than any other LAR." OSAGWI; Lead Sheet 5685; Aug. 13, 1997.

The information revealed in these three interviews represent a large, unturned stone which could help explain how and why thousands of Gulf War veterans may have been unnecessarily exposed to depleted uranium contamination. The following individuals should be identified and questioned to determine whether they acted negligently in ignoring warnings about DU or trying to silence those who were expressing concern:

The Logistics Assistance Officer (LAO) from the 1st Armored Division.
The Executive Officer (XO) of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
The individual at Doha who was told enlisted soldiers should not be sweeping the compound contaminated with depleted uranium.
The "full bird" at Doha [possibly Col. Bacevich] who questioned the AMCCOM civilian about proper cleanup procedures.
The person at the "AMC Surgeon General’s Office" (possibly the Army Surgeon General’s Office) who told the LAR to "stop stirring things up."

If some of these individuals acted negligently to withhold or ignore DU warnings, they should be held accountable. Important lessons may be learned from the incidents described above which could help prevent or minimize DU exposures to American fighting forces in the future.

British Government Issues DU Advisory

On July 5, 1999, the United Kingdom National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) issued an advisory to British citizens traveling to Kosovo. This advisory can be found at: http://www.nrpb.org.uk/D-uran.htm.

Depleted Uranium

"Depleted uranium (DU) is used in armour piercing ammunition because of its very high density. It has been used in two recent military campaigns, the Gulf War and Kosovo. The amount of radioactivity in DU is low, and is less than in naturally occurring uranium to which we are all exposed in, for example, drinking water. Concerns have been raised that DU contamination might present a health risk to both military personnel and civilian populations. There are two types of potential hazard posed by the use of DU: a chemical toxicity hazard and a radiation hazard. There are a number of ways in which either UK troops or civilians could be exposed to DU during or after these conflicts. The most likely risk would be if people enter areas that have been damaged and contaminated by DU ammunition. The risk depends on the chemical form of this contamination. If the contamination is soluble then DU could be absorbed in to the body following inhalation or ingestion. In this case the kidney is the organ most likely to be affected by the heavy metal chemical toxic effect of DU. If the areas are contaminated by insoluble uranium oxides, then any hazard would arise from disturbing the contamination and inhaling the dust. The insoluble dust could be deposited in the lungs and over a very long period could be a contributory cause of lung cancer. In both cases very large exposures would be required to cause a significant increase in the risk of either kidney damage or lung cancer.

"People visiting or working in Kosovo, for example press and relief agencies, should seek advice from appropriate authorities on the disposition of damaged vehicles or areas of DU contamination and avoid disturbing these areas. If access to potentially contaminated areas is deemed essential, then advice should be sought from the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign Office on any protective measures required.

"Information on DU can be obtained from the page on the Ministry of Defence web site concerning the illnesses of Gulf War veterans."

This advisory shows the British government is concerned that its citizens might be exposed to depleted uranium contamination in Kosovo. The important message in this advisory should be widely distributed within Kosovo: stay away from areas potentially contaminated with DU.

DU in the Kosovo War

In the wake of the Kosovo War, Pentagon spokesmen have belittled depleted uranium as a "non-issue." The Department of Defense steadfastly denies depleted uranium will affect the health of any soldiers or civilians. To support their assertion, Pentagon spokesmen hold up the RAND depleted uranium report. On the other end of the spectrum, Yugoslav propaganda has blown the DU issue out of all proportion. In Greece, Serb nationalists claim "that 80,000 U.S. soldiers who fought in the Gulf War are languishing in army hospitals, suffering from radiation-induced illnesses, brought on by the uranium in the missiles." Guardian, May 23, 1999. Yugoslav spin doctors claim detections of elevated levels of radiation in the air in Macedonia and Kosovo and warn of regional catastrophe.

In between the propaganda flowing freely from the Department of Defense and the Yugoslav government there is a middle ground. The dangers of depleted uranium contamination in Kosovo and Yugoslavia are real, but they are most likely limited to the impact areas. As noted by the U.K. National Radiological Protection Board, people should avoid entering areas where depleted uranium ammunition was used. People should stay away from equipment and buildings which may have been hit by DU ammunition or Tomahawk Cruise Missiles (which carry a DU counterweight). If people climb on and enter contaminated equipment, they may inhale or ingest DU dust. An inhalation of just 0.2 mg of depleted uranium dust meets the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission recommended daily limit on intake for a member of the general public. BRL, p. 18.

A May 1999 report from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Environment and Human Settlements Aspects, discusses NATO’s use of depleted uranium ammunition in Yugoslavia. The report states: "According to the available data, NATO forces have used . . . special ammunition containing depleted uranium in bombing military and civilian targets." UNEP, p. 9. The report correctly notes the impacts of depleted uranium ammunition create extremely fine uranium dust which poses a radiological and toxicological hazard. "Radiological as well as chemical contamination ‘do not distinguish’ among military personnel who use this [sic] weapons, among targets, territories, innocent present civilians, the press, the crew and teams that provide all sort of assistance, nor are they confined within any state boundaries or a specified time period." UNEP, p. 9.

Most of UNEP’s observations on DU are essentially accurate, but the UNEP report does exaggerate the hazard to neighboring countries: "Oxide particles . . . can be carried by the wind over several hundred kilometers. Since northwestern winds are most common in the Yugoslav region, this practically means that pollution goes from Yugoslavia to Hungary, Germany, Croatia and Bosnia or to Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece." UNEP, p. 9. Because most of the depleted uranium dust created by impacts is respirable in size (<5 microns), DU oxides can be carried downwind for long distances. However, most of the oxides settle out within 50 meters of an impacted vehicle, and the remainder that are carried downwind would likely be dispersed into concentrations that pose little health risk.

Depleted uranium could potentially contaminate drinking water supplies in the areas where it was shot. Approximately 75% of DU rounds fired from aircraft miss their target and implant themselves the earth. Over time, DU rounds oxidize to dust, with oxidation occurring most rapidly in water or a wet environment. U.S. Army Chemical School, p. 15. The UNEP report notes: "One of the most dangerous consequences is pollution of underground waters. The Balkans in general, and Yugoslavia in particular, are rich with underground water resources. These waters, lying at different depths, are the most important source of drinking water." UNEP, p. 10.

The fact that NATO destroyed relatively few Yugoslav tanks and other equipment makes it likely a relatively small amount (probably thousands of pounds) of depleted uranium was released in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, compared to the 640,000 pounds of DU released during the 1991 Gulf War. In a demonstration of the United States government’s humanitarian concerns for the people of Kosovo, the Department of Defense should provide a map of the areas where depleted uranium ammunition was shot, similar the map it produced of DU contamination from the Gulf War. This information could be used by local authorities and relief organizations to identify and isolate contaminated equipment, soil, and water.

Once contaminated equipment and areas are identified, United States and NATO armed forces should conduct a proper clean-up, and described in U.S. Army Technical Bulletin 9-1300-278, Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions and Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium:

Before transporting the [DU-contaminated] tank to the designated facility, any contaminated ground surface over which the tank must pass to exit the radiation contamination control line must first be decontaminated. This may entail the removal of the top layer of soil and disposal of the soil as radioactive waste, or the cleaning of a hard-surfaced road. TB, p. 4-4.

The contaminated equipment should also be wrapped in a tarp prior to movement, because "equipment contaminated with DU oxides can become a source of contamination when the oxides are resuspended, blown, washed, or otherwise dislodged during transit." AEPI, p. 80.

Unfortunately, the United States government’s humanitarian concerns do not appear to extend to civilian populations and relief workers living in areas contaminated with depleted uranium. In a July 19, 1999 letter to Paul Sullivan, Executive Director of the National Gulf War Resource Center, the Department of Defense refused to release information about locations and quantities of DU contamination in Kosovo. The letter states the Director of the Joint Staff denied access to this information, because "The issues related to the use of depleted uranium in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia area of operations are under litigation in the International Court of Justice. Any answers we provide at this time may impact the interests of the United States in these proceedings."

In the meantime, returning Kosovar Albanians are moving back into areas contaminated with a variety of pollutants released during the war, including depleted uranium. A photograph in the July 5, 1999 edition of U.S. News and World Report shows eleven young boys playing on a destroyed tank. The caption reads: "Kosovar Albanian children play on a Serbian tank destroyed by NATO." It is difficult to tell whether this tank was hit by DU rounds. There are small impacts on the front slope of the tank, and the tank appears to have burned. Nonetheless, it is unlikely the children are aware of either the use of depleted uranium ammunition or the potential the tank may be contaminated.

The smiling faces of the young boys, dressed in shorts and t-shirts, contrast sharply with guidance provided to Logistics Assistance Representatives (LAR’s) in Saudi Arabia just before the Gulf War. The message sent to the LAR’s describes the protective equipment needed when climbing on and entering tanks contaminated by depleted uranium:

The number of personnel who take part in the vehicle recovery should be kept to an absolute minimum. They are to be dressed in protective coveralls, gloves, rubberized boots, and they are to also wear the M25 or M17A2 protective mask with M13A2 filter element and the accompanying head covers (i.e. Mission Oriented Protective Posture [MOPP] level 4). The coverall pant legs are to be worn over the rubber boots and sealed with tape at the ankles. Likewise, the sleeves are to be slipped over the gloves and taped. The edges of the hood are to be draped over the coveralls and taped to them and the place where it contacts the respirator. Also, any remaining openings are to be sealed with tape. OSAGWI, p. 74.

Someone apparently neglected to pass this message on to the Kosovar Albanian children.

During and immediately after the 1991 Gulf War, the United States’ use of depleted uranium ammunition received relatively little attention. As time passed and knowledge of DU grew, the Department of Defense tried to avoid responsibility for battlefield clean-up and health care costs for veterans exposed to DU dust and debris. The use of depleted uranium ammunition in the Kosovo War created serious public relations problems for the Department of Defense. However, propaganda about the health effects of depleted uranium flowed as freely from Yugoslav spokesmen as it does from the Pentagon. While the debate continues about the dangers of DU, young children and others play on tanks and return to areas contaminated with depleted uranium. The Pentagon spin-machine has shifted into high gear, trying desperately to avoid a painful spill.

U.S. Army Switches to Tungsten

Out of concern for human health and the environment, the U.S. Army will start using tungsten in bullets instead of lead. "The bullets, which are used primarily for shooting practice during peace time, are as deadly to humans as their predecessors but less deadly to the earth," states the International Tungsten Industry Association. Reuters, July 21, 1999. Lead bullets tend to cause a buildup in the environment, often ending up in sediments, surface water and groundwater. This accumulated lead can harm wildlife, as well as people if they get their water from a contaminated source. Reuters, July 21, 1999.

In DoD Analysis I, I discuss the Army’s reasons for switching from tungsten to depleted uranium in kinetic energy penetrators. Free access to large quantities of depleted uranium was the overriding factor in the decision to switch from tungsten to DU for kinetic energy penetrators. Michael Maby of the London-based International Tungsten Industry Association recently noted "tungsten had been used in armaments that pierce tank armour, but high prices for the metal in the late 1970s prompted a switch to cheaper materials such as depleted uranium." Toronto Globe and Mail, July 21, 1999.

Bernard Rostker and other Pentagon spokesmen strongly promote the use of depleted uranium over tungsten for kinetic energy penetrators. Rostker asserts only DU rounds can defeat the antiquated T-55 and T-72 tanks in the inventories of our potential adversaries. Rostker and his staff have talked of tungsten rounds "bouncing off" tanks, creating the impression tungsten rounds are completely ineffective. However, tungsten rounds are capable of penetrating even the depleted uranium armor on Abrams tanks.

In 1987, the Ballistic Research Laboratory conducted a test to determine contamination levels from the impact of depleted uranium, tungsten, and high explosive rounds fired at an Abrams tank fitted with DU armor. In one test, a tungsten round penetrated the DU armor on the tank and entered the crew compartment. The report states: "The tank crew compartment was contaminated because this test was designed to penetrate the turret armor." BRL, p. 13. Though penetration took place under specially designed conditions, the test does prove tungsten rounds are capable of penetrating even DU armor. This raises the question of whether tungsten rounds are sufficient to penetrate the vastly inferior armor on T-55 or T-72 tanks.

The July 1990 report Kinetic Energy Penetrator Environmental and Health Considerations (SAIC), compares the merits and drawbacks of tungsten and depleted uranium ammunition. The report states:

While much more is known about the health effects of uranium than of tungsten alloys, the comparable information on chemical toxicity indicates that insoluble DU is approximately 25 times more toxic than insoluble tungsten and soluble DU is 20 times more toxic than soluble tungsten when exposure is at the limits allowed by the regulations. SAIC, Vol. 2, 1-1.

The significantly greater toxicity of DU prompted SAIC to note: "Cleanup requirements on ranges and the battlefield, as well as combat exposures to soldiers, appear to favor tungsten, although these issues remain unsettled as discussed elsewhere in this report." SAIC, Vol. 1, 2-6. After considering the SAIC report, the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) recommended "a long-term ballistic enhancement effort for tungsten . . . which considers penetrator/target interactions and attempts to determine appropriate material engineering to promote improved terminal ballistics." AMCCOM, p. VI-9.

The SAIC report also observed: "Public relations efforts are indicated [for DU], and may not be effective due to the public’s perception of radioactivity. Fielding and combat activities present the potential for adverse international reaction. Public relations efforts are not needed [for tungsten]. Increased costs can be expected for DU public relations when compared to tungsten." SAIC, Vol. 1, 2-5.

U.S. Army commanders appear to have decided to switch from lead to tungsten bullets out of a concern for the long-term health and environmental consequences of lead. The Army leadership should further explore their consciences by beginning open, honest dialogue about alternatives to the use of depleted uranium, such as tungsten alloy. Just think of all the public relations money the Army, OSAGWI, and the Department of Defense could save if they switched from DU to tungsten!

Canada: No to DU

On May 31, 1999, Mr. Gordon Earle, a Canadian Member of Parliament from Halifax West, debated the use of depleted uranium munitions by NATO forces in Kosovo. Mr. Earle stated:

Mr. Speaker, it appears that U.S. A-10 Warthog jets are deploying depleted uranium shells in Kosovo. Since this is being done under the NATO umbrella, to which we are a partner, we bear responsibility for this atrocious act. Turning a blind eye to the use of depleted uranium in Kosovo is not only unacceptable but also unforgivable . . . NATO is not a foreign power. It is we. It is the people in this House . . . Canadians, Yugoslavians and especially pregnant women and children in the region being bombed have the right to know that this government will not stop until it can assure all of us that any and all use of DU is stopped. House of Commons Debates, May 31, 1999.

In response to MP Earle, Mr. Robert Bertrand, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, stated:

We are sending some 800 members of the Canadian armed forces to the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia as part of our commitment to an international force that will help implement a peace accord . . . There are no munitions containing depleted uranium in the Canadian forces’ inventory. There are no plans to purchase or use such ammunition in the future. Canada does not allow any foreign testing or use of depleted uranium ammunition on Canadian soil. Some of our NATO allies are using this type of ammunition. The use of depleted uranium is not restricted by any international arms control treaty or convention. Exposure to depleted uranium has been investigated as a possible cause for illness, in particular in gulf war veterans. None of the scientific work published to this day supports a link between exposure to depleted uranium and illnesses in gulf war veterans, including cancer and birth defects. American investigators followed gulf war veterans with depleted uranium shrapnel in their bodies and have not found any illnesses compatible with heavy metal or radiation poisoning. House of Commons Debates, May 31, 1999.

Mr. Bertrand’s response clearly states Canada does not and will not use depleted uranium ammunition. Unfortunately, Mr. Bertrand also repeats almost verbatim the Pentagon’s official statements on the health effects of depleted uranium. Mr. Bertrand should note that Japan and Puerto Rico did not allow the use of depleted uranium ammunition on their soil, yet the U.S. Marine Corps mistakenly shot DU rounds in both places. Sadly, the use of depleted uranium weapons in Kosovo has been debated more in the Canadian Parliament than in the United States Congress.

Rhymes with "Cheddar"

Several years ago, the Department of Defense was forced to admit Gulf War veterans were exposed to chemical warfare agents when portions of the Gulf War Central Command Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Log were released. For reasons never adequately explained by DoD, vast sections of this log were lost and/or destroyed, even though the log was classified secret and kept in two separate locations in locked safes in hardcopy and on computer disk. Not a shred of the missing sections of this log has yet been located.

The U.S. Army’s 22nd Support Command (SUPCOM) maintained a log of incidents related to the July 11-12, 1991 munitions fire at Doha, Kuwait. As discussed in DoD Analysis II, entries in the SUPCOM logs include warnings about the hazards of burning depleted uranium munitions, and a request for monitoring of airborne DU. Most of the important SUPCOM log entries mentioning depleted uranium are not discussed in the OSAGWI DU report. Among the more interesting entries ignored by OSAGWI is entry 56: "1930 hrs -- Bill Shirley (Supcom Safety Officer) came into LOC, wanted to know who is conducting Safety Investigation. Wanted to keep news of ‘Radiation’ out of press." SUPCOM, Entry 56.

In response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from Chris Kornkven, President of the National Gulf War Resource Center, the Department of Defense recently released a portion of the SUPCOM log for the Doha fire. The log contains 134 entries. However, a page inserted into the log states: "Doc missing 71. thru 104, 13 pages [illegible] on document." SUPCOM. The missing entries cover the time period from 2210 hours on July 11 until 1430 hours on July 12. This was a crucial time during the fire and its immediate aftermath. The version of the SUPCOM log found online (in the Endnotes section of OSAGWI’s DU report) is also missing entries 71 through 104.

Based on the released portions of the SUPCOM log and the statements of soldiers interviewed by OSAGWI, it appears serious errors in judgment were made during and after the Doha fire. Warnings about DU were issued and ignored, protective clothing was recommended but disregarded, and concerns about inadequate monitoring and cleanup were expressed but silenced. The missing section of the SUPCOM log may clear up some of the questions about the Doha fire, just as the missing CENTCOM NBC log would likely shed light on Gulf War chemical exposures. Perhaps the SUPCOM log suffered the same fate as the CENTCOM log, and not a shred of either will ever be found.

Documents Cited in "A Fear of Falling"

10 C.F.R. 20: "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1998.

AEPI: Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use in the U.S. Army. U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI). June 1995.

AFRRI: Health Effects of Depleted Uranium. Project Briefing. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), Bethesda, MD. July 1999.

AFFRI(a): Electrophysiological Changes in Hippocampal Slices Isolated from Rats Embedded with Depleted Uranium Fragments. Pellmar, T.C. et al. NeuroToxicology. Accepted February 26, 1999.

AFFRI(b): Transformation of Human Osteoblast Cells to the Tumorigenic Phenotype by Depleted Uranium-Uranyl Chloride. Miller, A.C. et al. Environmental Health Perspectives. August 1998. Vol. 106, Number 8, pp. 465-471.

AMCCOM: Kinetic Energy Penetrator Long Term Strategy Study (Abridged). U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) Task Force. Fliszar, R. July 24, 1990.

AMCCOM-SWA: Vehicle Assessment Report, Depleted Uranium Contamination. Memo from Depleted Uranium Recovery Team to Senior Command Representative, AMCCOM - Southwest Asia (SWA). May 14, 1991.

BRL: Radiological Contamination from Impacted Abrams Heavy Armor. U.S. Army Laboratory Command; Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL); Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Fliszar, R. et al. Technical Report BRL-TR-3068. December 1989.

Case Narrative: Case Narrative: Depleted Uranium Exposures. Swords to Plowshares, National Gulf War Resource Center, the Military Toxics Project. Fahey, D. 3rd Edition, September 20, 1998 (first edition March 2, 1998).

DoD Analysis I: DoD Analysis I. Fahey, D. April 12, 1999.

DoD Analysis II: DoD Analysis II: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly. Fahey, D. June 29, 1999.

GAO: Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal with Depleted Uranium Contamination. U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO/NSIAD-93-90. January 1993.

Guardian: "Blind eye in the Balkans." Warrillow, Lucie. Guardian Weekly. Manchester, England. May 23, 1999. P. 25.

House of Commons Debates: "War in Kosovo: Danger of environmental devastation." Gordon Earle, MP Halifax West; earleg@parl.gc.ca. May 31, 1999.

NRPB: Depleted Uranium. United Kingdom National Radiological Protection Board. July 1999. http://www.nrpb.org.uk/D-uran.htm.

OSAGWI: Environmental Exposure Report: Depleted Uranium in the Gulf. Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI). U.S. Department of Defense. July 31, 1998.

OSAGWI (a): Transcript of Press Conference, "Gulf War Illness Update Briefing with Dr. Bernard Rostker and Dr. Ross Anthony, DoD News Briefing." April 15, 1999.

PSOB: Hearing, Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents. July 13, 1999. George Washington University, Washington, DC.

RAND: A Review of the Scientific Literature As It Pertains to Gulf War Illnesses: Vol. 7 Depleted Uranium. Harley, Naomi; Foulkes, Ernest; Hilborne, Lee; Hudson, Arlene; and Anthony, C. Ross. National Defense Research Institute, RAND. 1999.

Reuters: "Dept. Of Defense to Use Tungsten." Reuters Newsservice, London. July 21, 1999.

Rostker: "Remarks at the American Legion Washington Conference." Rostker, Bernard; Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, U.S. Department of Defense. Washington, DC. March 1998. Found at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/DU_speech.html

SAIC: Kinetic Energy Penetrator Environmental and Health Considerations. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). July 1990.

SUPCOM: "Doha Fire, SUPCOM [Support Command] LOC Sequence of Events Log." July 11-12, 1991.

TACOM: Environmental Assessment of the Abrams Heavy Armor System. U.S. Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). Predecisional Draft. April 13, 1998.

TB: Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions and Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC. TB 9-1300-278. September 1990.

Toronto Globe and Mail: "‘Green’ bullet kills people, but not the environment." Toronto Globe and Mail. Mittelstaedt, Martin. July 21, 1999.

U.S. Army Chemical School: Development of Depleted Uranium Training Support Packages: Tier I - General Audience Final Lesson Plan: Task [DU2] Identify Protective Actions in a DU/Low-Level Radiologically Contaminated Environment. U.S. Army Chemical School. EAI Report 69-4/95/002AF. November 1995.

UNEP: Mission Report: United Nations Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - Environment and Human Settlements Aspects. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Kante, Bakary. May 1999.

VA(a): "Minutes of Meeting, November 17 and 18, 1997." Department of Veterans Affairs Gulf War Expert Scientific Advisory Committee. November 17, 1997.

VA(b): Transcript of VA satellite teleconference on DU. Dr. Melissa McDiarmid, VA DU Program. March 25, 1997.

Web Sites Containing Depleted Uranium Information

http://www.spidersmill.com/gwvrl [Contains Gulf War DU Map]

http://www.miltoxproj.org [Has U.S. Army training videos on-line]

http://www.ngwrc.org/

http://www.rama-usa.org/

http://web-light.nl/index.html

I can not vouch for the accuracy of the information on each web site.