GulfLink Document of the Month

GulfLink document of the month
Updated 25 July 1999

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Document

980724_sep96_decls6_

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Page 0001

Subject = DOHA CAMP ACCIDENT SURVEY UPDATE
Box ID = BX007018
Folder title = DOHA ACCIDENT UPDATE 29 JUL 91 B
Unit = OSAGWI
Parent = USAGWD
L 4
UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, US Army Communications-Electronics Command
Fort Mo=outhe NJ 07703-5024
AMSEL-SF-RAI)CON 31 July 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Task Force Victory (Fwd), ATTN:
AETSBCS-V, Cimp Doha, Kuwait, APO 098889-0003
SUBJECT-. Doha Camp Accident Survey Update
1. Reference your memorandum, 31 July 1991, SUBJECT:
Redep@oyment of the U.S. Army RAD CON Team.
2. As you requested in the above reference the following is provide(JA
a. BACKGROUND. The US Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Team, US Arm Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth- 'r---NJ, deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 16 July 199 -fh-I.. e mission of the RADCON team was to provide rad72-a@tio@n protraction guidance and assistance to support the recovery of vehicles and the clean UP Of the Doha accident site.
b. ACCOMPLISHMENTS. The Army RADCON Team completed radiation surveys of all areas cleared by EOD. Three 55-gallon drums containing DU penetrators and a pile of burned penetrators were in the cleared site. The RADCON and DU Recovery Teams placed this 'material into the three contaminated Ml tanks for shipment to the US. Seven M8AI Chemical Agent Alarm Systems containing Americium-241 were also involved in the fire. one was recovered from the area cleared by EOD. The radioactive source cell was not damaged. one additional M8AI was recovered from one of the MI Tanks removed from the area near tho wash rack. The radioactive source cell was penetrated by a fragment from the explosion and burned in the fire. No alpha radiation contamination was detected. This M8Al was placed in one of the contaminated Xi tanks for shipment to the US for.disposal. The dump site located near the camp were debris was discarded was also surveyed. The survey of the dump site located one DU penetrator (Uranium-238) which was recovered for disposal.
c. CURRENT SITUATION. There is no radiation hazard to personnel outside the exclusion area. Five MSAIS and an unknown quantity of DU penetrators in solid, melted, and burned states may exist in the exclusion area.
d. RECOMMENDATIONS. All personnel entering this area must be made aware of the potential hazard which may exist. Any clean-up effort must include appropriate radiation protection support and proper disposal of radioactive material.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 0002

Subject = DOHA CAMP ACCIDENT SURVEY UPDATE
Box ID = BX007018
Folder title = DOHA ACCIDENT UPDATE 29 JUL 91 B
Unit = OSAGWI
Parent = USAGWD
may-26-@:J@8 lb:28 AMr-UU(-&Z@- Nm(- @cien4-es t:$r P-15
UNCLASSIFIED
AMSEL-SP-PADCON
SUBJECT: Doha Camp Accident Survey Update
3. You may request future RADCON Team support by contacting
Commander, US Army Material Command, ATTN: AMCCN-N (COL Lacotta), 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333-0001, DSN. 284-5550.
4. You may contact us directly thru Commander, US Army
Communications-Electronics Command, ATTN: AMSEL-SP-RADCON, Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703-5024, DSN 995-3112/4427.

STEVEN A. HORNE
Director, US Army RADCON

Please note the extent of the knowledge of the hazard from DU at Camp Doha in 1991, yet it was not until OSAGWI released their Environmental Exposure report on DU that the DOD or VA started providing medical care to these troops.

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File: 980724_sep96_decls4_0001.txt
Page: 0001
Total Pages: 3
Subject = SF -CG'S CIR Box ID = BX007018
Folder title = DOHA ACCIDENT UPDATE 29 JUL 91 B
Unit = OSAGWI
Parent = USAGWD
UNCLASSIFIED
type 1
(message 1: 5787 bytes)
Date: Fri, 29 Nov 91 13:44:17 EST
From: AMSEL-SF
To: AnAel-Cg@MONMOUTH-MO3.ARMY.MIL
cc: ansel-sf@moNmouTIi-M3.ARMY.NILI amsel-og-l$MONMOUTH-EMH3.ARMY.MIL,
amsel-cs@MONMOUTE-M3.ARMY.NIL, amsel-dcb@MONMOUTH-EM3.ARKY.MIL,
allsel-gs@XONMOUTH-EM3.ARKY-MIL
SUBJECT: SF - CG'S CIR - 11/29/91
1. VALUED INFORKATION.
a. Camp Doha Accident Site Update.
(1) We have recently received EMail from our LARs that a Contractor EOD team completed clearing the site in late November. The 22nd SUPCOM Area Support Battalion Cnmmander reported that the Contractq7@ EOD team conducted radiation measurements on each piece of equipment removed from the site and that any contaminated equipment identified was properly disposed as radioactive wastp.
(2) The 2 the area after it was cleared by th@e contractor I verified that there was no detectable contamination.
(3) 1 spoke with d S officer to th nd cated tha 41A*-tu-,fixil-someone to re concerns regarding Depleted Uranium (DU). Apparently sent a message to the State Department regarding these concerns and this was forwarded to the Department of the Army.
(4) 1 was able to address concerns dealing with the Camp Doha issue and I reiterated the current status and results to LTC Ware. I suggested that LTC Ware visit KAJ Tucker, L@.kO- FOX-It42:d. to verify the current status. ------
(5) LTC Ware indicated that he was to visit CgIL-Eialds@ Dhahran, Kuwait, who was responsible for-all EOD in tEe- area of operation. It wag su@ggeste@d th@at he also--s-ee--th-0 DECOM LARS I for first hand information, before they depart the theater.
(6) LTC Ware asked if RADCON could come to Kuwait to check out all areas, including Camp Doha and surrounding potentially contaminated areas, all tank fire training ranges and "Valley of Death* Road leading to Iraq where there was hundreds of destroyed vehicles of all types. He requested that we come for a six week period. X indicated that the decision to deploy RADcoN for that period of time has to come from OSA/OSD 'levels, and not from CECOM.
(7) LTC ware called again and spoke to mr. Dave Sharman and suggested that AMC contact CENTCOX to verif3@-me-vtltus@of the Camp Doha accident site cleanup effort and provide a report regarding this matter. This report should$ as a minimumf contain the following: (a) The units and responsible individuals
UNCLASSIFIED

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File: 971030_90112812_rii_001.txt
Page: 001
Total Pages: 1
DTG: 281240Z NOV 90
[b.2.]
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO RII-1021; IZ CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
1. This assessment represents the best judgement of the most experienced and knowledgable CW analysts in the Intelligence Community. Realizing the potential implications of this assessment, it was not taken lightly.
2. DIA, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community believes that Iraqi unitary chemical munitions have a short shelf life -- a duration of 3-6 weeks is considered the norm. [b.1. sec. 1.5.c.]

Iraq has been unable to produce high quality chemical agent in its production plants due to poor operating practice. [b.1. sec. 1.5.c.] nerve agent produced at Samarra is of poor quality. Sarin produced at Samarra has a purity of between 20 and 50 percent due to poor quality control of the chemical process as well as the precusor chemicals which are used. (By contrast, the extremely small amount of Iraqi labaratory produced Sarin has a purity level of 90 percent and retains its potent toxicity.
3. Due to the deficiencies of Iraqi chemical processes and the impurity of their chemical precursors, DIA continues to believe that all stock piles of Iraqi unitary chemical agents have a limited shelf life.
4. DIA has no information to substantiate the claim that the Soviets assisted the Iraqis with their chemical weapons production program. assistance [b.1. sec. 1.5.c.] rendered to the Iraqis would be contravened by poor operating practice.
5. Probably the majority of Iraqi chemical agents are filled into munitions, with a small reserve stockpile retained in bulk chemical form.
6. We believe the Iraqi binary agents are most likely the nerve agent sarin (GB) and GF. [b.1. sec. 1.5.a., e.] [b.1. sec. 1.5.c.]
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File: 980811_sep96_decls1_0001.txt
Page: 0001
Total Pages: 3
Subject = CDRS UPDATE ON THE LEISHMANIASIS IDENTIFIED IN SWA
Box ID = BX003208
Folder Title = COMMANDERS UPDATE
File Cabinet = Week-38
Parent Organization = HSC
File Room = sep96_classified
File Room = sep96_classified
File Room = sep96_classified
File Room = sep96_classified
DECLASSIFIED
ON: 03 APR 98
BY.-SE-C--A-RMY-JADA) -UNDE-RTSECerf) EEtOT1295& -----
E L E C T R 0 N I C M A I L
(DDN Host Address: V3.HANSCOM.AF.MIL)
Date:
From: MDSCC
Username: MDSCC@MRGATE@EMISI
Dept:
Tel No:
TO: 94-ARCOM@Al
Subject: D*MSG: COMMANDERS UPDATE ON THE LEISHMANIASIS IDENTIFIED IN
RCTUZFDY RHCGAAA4467 32319@.5 RUWT-UUUU--RUEOFFR.
RCTUZYUW RHCGAAA4487 32319@@5-UUUU--RUEOFFR.
ZNR UUUUU
19180OZ NOV 91
FM CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCMD-PM//
TO AIG 9879
AIS 9169
R 152303Z NOV 91
FM DA WASH DC//HQDA//SGPS-PSZ//
TO AIG 7406//
BT
UNCLAS
SUBJECT: COMMANDERS UPDATE ON THE LEISHMANIASIS IDENTIFIED IN SOLDIERS RETURNING FROM SOUTHWEST ASIA (SWA)
A. MSG 121853Z NOV 91, SUBJECT: LEISHMANIASIS IDENTIFIED IN SOLDIERS RETURNING FROM SOUTHWEST ASIA (SWA) B. MSG 08210OZ NOV 91 SUBJECT: DEFERRAL OF MILITARY DONORS 1. DISSEMINATE TO COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS. 2. THIS IS TO INFORM COMMANDERS OF AN INFECTION DUE TO THE PARASITE LEISHMANIA TROPICA AMONG A SMALL NUKMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO DEPLOYED TO SOUTHWEST ASIA (SWA) DURING THE GULF WAR (REF A). TO DATE, ONLY SEVEN CASES HAVE BEEN DIAGNOSED AT WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER (WRAMC). NORMALLY, IN INFECTION WITH LEISHMANIA TROPICA RESULTS IN SKIN SORES ONLY; HOWEVER, ALL OF THESE CASES WERE FREE OF SKIN SORES AND, IN EACH CASE, THE PARASITE WAS RECOVERED FROM THE BONE MARROW. (FIVE OF THE SIX SYMPTOMATIC CASES HAVE ALREADY BEEN TREATED, DID WELL, AND ARE BACK TO DUTY). ONE OF THE SEVEN CASES WAS TOTALLY ASYMPTOMATIC.
PAGE 02 RUEADWD9716 UNCLAS
3. RISK FACTORS FOR THESE SEVEN CASES ARE NOT WELL DEFINED AT THIS TIME. THESE SOLDIERS WERE MEMBERS OF SEVERAL DIFFERENT ARMY UNITS WIDELY SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE SWA THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN BOTH FIELD AND URBAN SETTINGS. NAVY, MARINE, AIR FORCE AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO WERE STATIONED WITHIN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS ARE ALSO CONSIDERED AT RISK OF EXPOSURE.
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Editors Comments: Please note the knowledge of the hazards associated with CARC painting, yet soldiers who conducted this painting had a very difficult time getting proper medical care from the VA for their medical conditions resulting from this painting.

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File: 980818_sep96_sagwi2_0002.txt Page: 0002 Total Pages: 5

Subject = TRENDS DURING PREP Box ID = BX001119
Folder Title = 15TH FINANCE SUPPORT UNIT MESSAGE TRAFFIC
Unit = 1ST CD
Parent = VII CORPS
UNCLASSIFIED
DEVIATIONS FROM SAFETY PkocEDupEs
DURINC; PREPARATFON POP OPERATION DESERT SH3fELD
1. Non-use of seat belts. Many driverstpassengers of Amvs in operation, especially M1008s and M1009s, have not been wearing the seat belts/shoulder harnesses provided. Such wear is required by AR 385-55.
2. Uncovered antenna tips. some tips of vehicle antennas, i.e., HMMWvs and CUCVS, and field type antennas, i.e., OE 254/RC 292 are not covered with tip caps or suitable substitutes. This creates a potential eye/head piercing hazard. At least three soldiers have been fatally injured Army-wide during the past two years from uncovered antenna tips.
3. Raised vehicle antennas. some vehicles have been operating in the cantonment area with their antennas in the raised position. Antennas,must be tied down when vehicles are operated in the cantormont area or in towns to avoid contact with electrical power lines IAW FH Suppl 1 to AR 385-10.
4. Tracked vehicles crossing roadways. According to the III Corps Range Control office Range Warden, some tracked vehicles have been crossing roads at designated tank crossing sites without using road guards. One such tracked vehicle was almost stru@k by a POV. Roadguards should be posted to warn oncoming traffic whenever tracked vehicles cross roadways on the installation.
5. Taping over of vehicle headlights, taillights, and reflectors. Several AMVs with taped over headlights, taillights, and reflectors have been stopped by the III Corps MPs to have such covers removed. In some cases, the mps have issued citations. Covering of lights/reflectors creates a traffic safety hazard and violates convoy procedures. Additionally, it wastos tape and the time of personnel involved.
6. Improper ground guiding. Some large vehicles are being backed in motor pools without use of ground guides. In one case, a HEMTT was being backed with two ground guides. The rear ground guide walked behind the vehicle and was pinned against a loading ramp. More training and supervision of ground guides and drivers in ground guiding is a must.
7. Inadequate supervision of CARC painting operations. Isolated cases of brush and roller painting of vehicles by small groups of soldiers not wearing required protective clothing and equipment have boon noted. Currently, spray painting operations at paint facilities are inadequately supervised. Personnel mixing paint and/or personnel such as drivers or onlookers are not following procedures. Some are smoking, some are wearing only shorts and T-shirts, and some are covered with paint. These deficiencies indicate that units responsible for painting their vehicles are not enforcing the rules. Also some vehicles have been observed with paint on tires, antennas, rearview mirrors, lights, and reflectors indicating lack of quality control.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search File: 970612_sep96_decls1_0001.txt Page: 0001 Total Pages: 2 Subject = REQUEST FOR DECLASS OF BW VACCINATION PROGRAM Parent Organization = HSC Unit = OTSG Folder Title = REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE VACCINATION PROGRAM Document Number = 1 Box ID = BX003206 OEOARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONSAND PLANS WASHINGTON. DC 20310-0400 REPty TO A,x NTIO)I Of 8 APR 1991 DAMO-SWC MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, ATTN: DASG-HCD-D SUBJECT: Request for Declassification of Biological Warfare Vaccination Program 1. Reference your request of 22 March 1991 for the declassification of the biological warfare vaccination program. 2. it is our considered opinion that the stringent classification and close-hold nature of the program can now be treated on an unclassified basis but should not be aired publicly except in response to specific question by individuals. 3. it is recommended that the AMEDD response to inquiry should read as follows: "As part of a broad program to to protect American service personnel and critical civilians from the potential use of biological warfare agents, many personnel received vaccinations for two specific substances::anthrax and botulinum toxin. The testing, procurement and administration of the materials was done under the careful scrutiny and control of well trained personnel from the US Army Medical Research and Development Command in concert with the US Food and Drug Administration. The anthrax vaccine is licensed for unlimited use and has been used safely on civilian and military laboratory personnel without incident. The I>otulinum vaccine is an Investigational New Drug and requires informed consent prior to use. The FDA and the MDD concurred that administration could be accomplished in absence of informed consent due to security reasons. Experience with both vaccines indicates that they are quite safe and offer effective protection against these two serious substancess. Further, additional testing will be accomplished by the AMEM."

Editors Comments: 1. The above seems to say the FDA was in the field with us when we received the shot, they were no where near us that I recall.
2. "Experience" indicates the vaccine had been tested and used, where is the medical data gathered from the testing showing it is safe and effective?
3. Why does "Further, additional testing will be accomplished by the AMEM." need to be accomplished if the vaccine is already deemed safe and effective?
4. Why was the vaccination program considered to be so secret that no documentation could be generated or left in the members medical record?
5. How many vaccination records are still in the 10,000 medical records recently "found" by the DOD?

Document 980811_aug97_decls1_ Pages 0001 | 0002 | 0003 Page 0001 Subject = NBC INFO UPDATE 1-91 Box ID = BX001093 Folder Title = NBC INFORMATION UPDATES 937TH ENG GP File Cabinet = Week-32 Parent Organization = VII CORPS UNCLASSIFIED -*fff- DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Headquarters, 937th Engineer Group (Combat) 20th Engineer Brigade (Combat) (Airborne) APO New York 09741

AFZN-EN-NBC 1 Feb 91

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: NBC Information Update # 1-91

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide information to
the units on NBC issues.

2. Biological Warfare.

a. Anthrax Protection.

(1) There are limited supplies of the anthrax vaccine. Priority has been given to fixed units. 20th Bde units are not expected to receive this vaccine. The use of the anthra)(pills (Cipro) will provide sufficient protection against an anthrax (biological warfare) attack.

(2) A 5-day supply of Cipro per soldier (one blister pack) was issued to each battalion. The XVIII Abn Corps requirement is to provide each soldier with a 30-day supply of Cipro. Units will requisition the additional Cipro through their Class 8 supply channel (MEDSOM). Cipro is packaged in cases of twelve boxes, each box containing ten blister packs. Each blister pack contains ten pills.

(3) The order to begin use of Cipro will come from XVIII Abn Corps through 20th En Bde to this headquarters. 937th En Gp will then issue the order to begin use. The dosage of Cipro is one pill every twelve hours (twice daily), not exceed 30 days.

b. Biological Attack Indicators.

(1) The symptoms of illness due to anthrax include flu-like symptoms such as nausea, vomiting and fever. This combined with a large number of soldiers becoming ill for no known reason is a good indicator of a SW attack. The appearance of large numbers of insects previously not in the area is another BW indicator.

UNCLASSIFIED

   DECLASSIFIED
   ON:27MAR98
   M%/. C% @f% A M RAN/ I A r%,
Unit = 1ST ID
Parent = VII CORPS

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Page 0002

Subject = NBC INFO UPDATE 1-91

Box ID = BX001093

Folder Title = NBC INFORMATION UPDATES 937TH ENG GP

File Cabinet = Week-32

Parent Organization = VII CORPS

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Other, BW attack indicators include: artillery shells that explode less powerfully than HE rounds, aircraft- of rocket-delivered bombs or containers that contain bomblets that pop rather than explode, aircraft that are spraying a mist or fog.

3. Chemical Attack Indicators.

a. There are two types of indicators of an NBC attack: high probability and possible attacks.

(1) High probability indicators are a sounding chemical alarm, a positive reading on chemical detector paper, and individuals exhibiting symptoms of chemical-agent poisoning.

(2) The indicators of a possible chemical attack include:

(i) Artillery shells that explode less powerfully than HE rounds.

(ii) Aircraft- or rocket-delivered bombs or containers that contain booblets that pop rather than explode.

(iii) Aircraft that are spraying a mist or fog.

b. MOPP Analysis. Commanders must guard against overreacting to NBC warfare. The degradation caused by wear,ing MOPP gear can be just as serious in many situations as the NBC hazard. Commanders should use MOPP analysis to make their MOPP decisions. Through MOPP analysis, in conjunction will METT-TI leaders can select the appropriate MOPP level. The MOPP analysis questions are listed below.

                   -What is the mission?
                   -What is the viork rate?
                   -How long will the wot,k take?
                   -Is the unit targeted?
                   -What is the warning time?
                   -What is the weather?
                   -What additional protection is available?
                   -What is the training and physical level?
                   -Is it day or night?

4. MOPP Suit.

UNCLASSIFIED
Unit = 1ST ID
Parent = VII CORPS

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Page 0003

Subject = NBC INFO UPDATE 1-91

Box ID = BX001093

Folder Title = NBC INFORMATION UPDATES 937TH ENG GP

File Cabinet = Week-32

Parent Organization = VII CORPS

UNCLASSIFIED

5. Mask Filter Serviceability.

a. Units are reminded the-mask filter change criteria for this theater of operations is every six month when not subjected to chemical attacks. Units should review their current mask filter status.

b. The criteria when subjected to chemical attacks remains the same. Filters must be changed after eight separate chemical attacks, unless attacked with blood agent. If attacked with blood agent, then filters must be changed as soon as possible.

6. M8Al Batteries (BA3517/U).

MBAI batteries are in short supply theater wide. Units should be prudent in their use of the batteries. Continue listing in LOGSTAT as a critical item.

7. Chemical Survey of AA Elm.

Members of 4/95th Chem Co (Decon) conducted a chemical survey of AA Elm. All the battalion areas and around the limits of the assembly at-ea were surveyed. There were negative results for both G-type and H-type agents.

S. Units are encouraged to submits questions or other NBC issues for future editions of this memo. POC at 937th En Gp is CPT Navarro, Group Chemical Officer.

                                     MARCOS 0. NAVARRO
                                     CPT, CM
                                     Group Chemical Officer
       DISTRIBUTION:
       Cdr, 2@th En Bn
       Cdr, 27th En Bn
       Cdr, 37th En Bn
       Cdr, HHC, 937th En Gp

UNCLASSIFIED
Unit = 1ST ID
Parent = VII CORPS

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